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Bruce MacLeod Thompson* A Critique of Lee Loevinger's
"Jurimetrics - The Next Step
Forward"
I. The Scientific Method and The Laplacian Demon
In my days as an undergraduate studying history at Mount Allison, a
professor from one of the large American universities visited the
campus and told us of "Operation Ben Franklin". A group of
eminent historians were engaged in a project whose aim was to
electronically re-create the great statesman using the scientific
method.
Using primary sources such as diaries, letters and documents, and
secondary sources such as printed books and journals, in short all
available data, the group with the aid of computers was collecting
and dissecting Franklin's writings. The goal was to produce each
step his mind took in his many experimentations and piece together
every fact connected with his diplomatic career. Not content with
this, the historians were bent on producing a record of what he did
during each and every day of his life. Moreover, they analyzed and
recorded the contents of each book in the man's extensive Library
along with the minutiae of the current events of Franklin's era, all in
an effort to recreate his mind. Rigorous control methods were used
to ensure the most accurate probabilities. The project, employing
dozens of people and costing millions of dollars, was to last well
into the next century and unless common sense has prevailed, it no
doubt continues.
The knowledge of this horrendous experiment had a great effect
on me at the time. I saw my career in history at an end if these were
the tools and goals of the trade. The maxim that history is closer to
literature than science was lost on these men.
Some of our neighbours to the South believed they could discover
the true Ben Franklin by a method - the scientific method of
gathering all available data, running controlled experiments and
coming up with distilled statistical truth. The truth would evolve as
an empirical quality. Facts fed by means of formulae through
mathematical processes would recreate the most probable Ben
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Franklin. Intuitively, I feel that Franklin would fail to recognize his
electronic self.
Jurimetrics, it appears, also seeks the truth in "true justice"
an empirical, tangible commodity. Empiricism is destroying the
social sciences; not only history but political science and economics
are being tortured with graphs and mathematical formulae. In the
early part of this century economics was a literature; now it is
almost completely "scientific", but to what effect? It is said of
economists that they are never right but they always ride first class.
Lawyers it appears want to join them. Lee Loevinger writes:
If we would increase our knowledge and have some chance at
arriving at an intelligent solution to our problems, it is essential
that we adopt scientific methods of inquiry.' [Also] The next step
forward in the long path of man's progress must be from
jurisprudence (which is mere speculation about law) to
juimetrics - which is the scientific investigation of legal
problems. 2 [Also] . . . [T]he problems of jurisprudence are
basically meaningless since they can only be debated but never
decided nor even investigated, whereas the questions of
jurimetrics are meaningful since they are capable of being
investigated and ultimately answered. ..
Using Loevinger's thesis, Reed Lawlor writes:
Modern logic can be employed to relate the output of a court to its
input in a legal proceeding, a pro or con decision constitutes the
output, and facts constitute the input. With modem logic, logical
equations can express the decisions (output) as a function of fact
patterns (input)...4
It is said scientific truths have a strange way of reflecting social
prejudices and I suggest the scientific method is a prejudice, most at
home in the United States, that reality must be predictable through
and through. The figure of the Laplacian Demon is a striking
symbol of this. Imagine, says Laplace, a being who knows the
position and momentum of every particle in the universe, together
with the laws of motion governing such particles. Such a being
would be able to predict all subsequent states of the universe;




4. Lawlor, R., "What Computers Can Do: Analysis and Prediction of Judicial
Decisions" (1960), 49 American Bar Association Journal 337, reprinted in
Schubert, Judicial Behavior (1964), at 492.
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however, such a being will never exist. Kant attempted to show
there were limits to reason in the nineteenth century but the Western
mind could be expected to take such a conclusion seriously only
when it showed up in the findings of science itself. Science has in
this century, with the discoveries of Heisenberg in physics and
G6del in mathematics, at last caught up with Kant.
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy shows that there are
essential limits to our ability to know and predict physical states of
affairs, and opens up to us a glimpse of nature that may at bottom be
irrational and chaotic. Mathematics from Plato onwards has been
the very model of intelligibility and the central citadel of
rationalism. Gbdel has shown that mathematics contain insoluble
problems that can be proven to be insoluble mathematically. Reality
can never, as a result, be enclosed within a completely rational
structure. We have to accept the fact that there are qualities forever
unknown to us. 5
I suggest that jurimetrics in its broad from, whose end is
adjudication and not merely the provision of information, is an
American ethno-centric belief now out of date. Present scientific
knowledge makes a mockery of the words of Justice Holmes, who
spoke of:
. . . an ultimate dependence [of law] upon science because it is
finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative worth
of our different social ends. . . [He continued]. . . very likely it
may be that, with all the help that statistics and every modem
appliance can bring us, there will be a commonwealth in which
science is everywhere supreme. 6
I assume he said this before he discovered that the life of the law
was not in logic but experience.
II. The Exception of Value - and The Value of Exception
I suggest the reason why many people take offense at the concept of
jurimetrics is not so much the fact that it is ethno-centric or now
without a realistic scientific base, it is rather the philosophy upon
which it is founded. Loevinger writes:
5. For more information on the ideas of Heisenberg and Gdidel see Barrett,
William, Irrational Man (New York: Doubleday, 1962).
6. Holmes, O.W., Collected Legal Papers (1920), 242 reprinted in Schubert,
supra, note 4.
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In the field of social control (which is law) we must at least begin
to use the same approach and the same methods that have enabled
us to progress toward greater knowledge and control in every
other field. 7 [Also, jurimetrics seeks to] . . . formulate
meaningful problems, institute effective techniques, gather valid
data, and finally not only enlarge our useful knowledge but
increase our control over both the environment and ourselves. 8
[Also] The greatest problem facing mankind at this mid-point of
the twentieth century is the inadequacy of socio-legal methods
inherited from primitive ancestors to control a society which, in
all other respects is based upon the powerful techniques of a
sophisticated science. 9
I suggest this fetish with control and conformity is the
philosophical base on which jurimetrics is founded and it is this
factory which offends people more than any other. The scientific
method is geared to large numbers, to systems, to common data. It
is not geared to the individual, the exception or uncommon data.
Loevinger has little time for the complaint that says jurimetrics, to
use his own words, ". . . is immoral because it disregards values."
I think this complaint is a valid objection. Our Western civilization,
through the Judeo-Christian heritage, is founded on the belief of the
supreme worth of the individual. The goal of our society has not
been a collective one, but rather the belief that the individual should
have the opportunity to reach his full potential as a human being.
Systems that are designed to control society and take account only
of the mass and not the exception are an anathema to this Western
tradition.
Reed Lawlor writes: "It has been calculated that courts cite prior
decisions of their own jurisdictions approvingly 95 per cent of the
time. Accordingly, it is reasonable to adopt the principles of stare
decisis in programming a computer." 10 This I suggest reinforces
the norm, is just to the mass of society and certainly exerts control,
but what of the anomalous five per cent to whom judges do not
apply precedent? These deviant statistics are the value judgments,
the basis of our Western society. Benjamin Cardozo wrote:
Stare decisis is not in the constitution, but I should be half ready
to put it there, and to add thereto the requirement of mechanical
and 1telal eprodxuction, if nly it Were tre that legislatn is a
7. Loevinger, supra, note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Lawlor, supra, note 4.
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sufficient agency of growth. The centuries have proved the need
of something more."
Jurimetrics makes us count, jurisprudence lets us think. I suggest it
is the value judgment - the emotional component, that is, if not the
key to the law, the Icey to justice.
III. What is Needed now is not Methodology but Ideology
What the law needs now is not so much a methodology but an
ideology. Cardozo said:
The power of creation, if it is to be exercised with vision and
understanding exacts a philosophy of law, a theory of its genesis
and growth and aim. Only thus shall we be saved from the
empiricism which finds in an opinion, not a prophecy to inspire
but a command to obeyed. [Also, the lawyer if] . . he locks an
adequate philosophy. . . either goes astray altogether, or at least
does not rise above the empiricism that pronounces judgment
upon particulars. 12
Curtis J. Berger describes the reality of today's young lawyer as a
technocrat. ". .. [I]t is better to be smart than passionate,
people who feel too deeply tend not to think too clearly . .
Thinking like a lawyer is ". . . an ability requiring a wholly
analytical matrix for dealing with problems." '3 He writes:
... we should train our students to deal with other human
beings, to begin to understand that the client who comes into a
lawyer's office is usually a troubled person, to begin to
appreciate that what surfaces as a legal problem very often has its
roots in deep-seated social problems. [He adds] . . . unless
lawyers value the compassionate in themselves, I think they will
be incapable of caring about the human needs of others. 14
Two facts occur to me. First, our present system is not fulfilling
this task of cultivating an ideology of concern. Secondly,
jurimetrics in its broadest sense would do so even less.
Allan Fotheringham satirises what technology has promised and
what it has delivered. He writes:
One can recall post-1945 when it was predicted that the
11. Cardozo, B., The Growth of the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1924) at 132.
12. Cardozo, supra, note 11 at 138 and 102.
13. Berger, C., "The Heart of the Law is the Heart of the Lawyer" editorial in The
New York Times, July 6, 1976.
14. Id.
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helicopter would revolutionize our lives. Jetting to the office in
one-man copters, whirlybird pads on every office building -
there was a nice Buck Rogers unreality to it all. The helicopters,
as we know, became mainly useful for killing large clumps of
people in Vietnam.15
Our ability to split the atom would ben another example. Jurimetrics
would indeed be cheaper, faster and more efficient but the question
is for whom? Again, the argument is between the collective and the
individual. Jurimetrics would make life easier for society, but not
for the accused who did not fall within the formula.
Jurimetrics in the narrow sense is and will increasingly become
useful in the work of the solicitor, high speed searches, compact
storage of large amount of information and accuracy cannot be
debated. I believe that this use of jurimetrics in the wider sense as a
substitute for advocacy or adjudication would be wrong.
To go some way to meeting the points raised by Professor Berger,
we now need not a methodology, but an ideology. Lord Denning
M.R. spoke of the difference last year while addressing the British
Law Society's National Conference. He reminded his audience of a
scene in Walter Scott's Guy Mannering. When Colonel Mannering
visits a great Scots Lawyer's chambers in Edinburgh he finds the
walls lined not with law books but with books of history and of
literature. Pointing to these books the lawyer says, "These are my
tools of trade." Denning concluded, "A lawyer without history or
literature is a mere mechanic, a mere working mason. If he has
some knowledge of these he may venture to call himself an
architect. That is what we must strive to be in the law." 16
Architects.
15. Allan Fotheringham, "The Exciting Adventures of Allan in Wonderland" in
MacLeans, March 3, 1980.
16. Guardian Gazette, vol. 76, No. 38, October 31, 1979.
